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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY OFFICERS USING CONTENT 
AND CONTEXTUAL QUESTIONING METHODS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This MBA research project is an extension and replication of recent diagnostic utility 
studies to determine if the methods used are (a) generalizable to a new population and (b) 
useful in identifying specific questioning strategies relevant to international military 
officers. Research conducted by Charles Bond and Bella DePaulo in 2006 indicated, on 
average, people are slightly better than fifty-fifty at detecting deception, as seen in a 
published Personality and Social Psychology Review article. Modern research ideology 
favors using diagnostic utility, which is the use of comprehensive questioning methods. 
In the past, a clear majority of researchers relied solely on verbal and nonverbal 
indicators to aid in deception detection. This new research uses specific questioning 
techniques that have been proven more reliable in determining deceptive behavior. 
Results from the quantitative analysis conducted in Study 1 exhibited that international 
military officers considered non-experts outperformed experts in their ability to detect 
deception. In addition, those considered experts performed better than previous research 
indicated, and the accuracy rate improved as content and contextual questioning methods 
were implemented. Results from the qualitative analysis conducted in Study 2 established 
that international military officers combined information obtained from other sources 
along with physical observations when detecting deception. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This research project is composed of two separate studies. The first study 
examines how contextual questioning methods are used in determining deception 
detection accuracy. The second study examines how people detect lies through nonverbal 
cues, leakage, and their experiences in social interactions. For decades, deception 
detection research was focused mainly on verbal and nonverbal cues to determine if 
someone is being deceptive. The authors acknowledge verbal and nonverbal cues are 
important in detecting deception; however, more recent research shows this to be the least 
reliable way to detect deception (Levine, Blair, and Clare, 2014; Bond and DePaulo, 
2006; Park, Levine, McCornack, Morrison, and Ferrara, 2002). Recent studies have 
shown third-party information combined with the way questions are framed, along with 
verbal and nonverbal cues, provided a statistically higher probability of detecting 
deception. The first study asserts a combination of these procedures will result in greater 
accuracy in detecting deception than any one method on its own. This research project 
focuses on students at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, CA, to 
generalize previous findings to a military population compared to civilian-only 
population. This research project specifically examines international military officers at 
NPS compared to both military and civilian populations. This research project also aims 
to gather additional data on the use of content and contextual based questioning to 
determine if deception detection rates would improve.  
More specifically, both studies seek to determine (1) if various questioning 
strategies increase international military officers’ ability to accurately detect deception, 
and (2) how international military officers detect deception in the workplace. This is the 
second iteration of these studies at NPS in determining what information international 
military officers utilize in making their judgments of deception detection. It must be 
noted the method used in this research project replicated studies conducted by Park et al. 
(2002) and Levine et al. (2014). Using the aforementioned studies as a framework for 
continued research in deception detection, Study 1 evaluates how international military 
officers detect deception along with how accurately they performed. The authors believe 
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these data can aid in critical areas, such as defector interrogation and counterintelligence 
operations. Additionally, the authors believe the first study can be replicated recurrently 
to solidify assumptions made in this research project and to fine-tune the methods so 
future researchers can obtain higher deception detection rates.  
A. BACKGROUND / PROBLEM 
As illustrated before, previous deception-detection accuracy research has mainly 
focused on verbal and nonverbal cues. This has led to many studies focusing on the same 
issue without expanding on new ideas or concepts in deception detection theories. Levine 
et al. developed the idea of diagnostic utility in 2014 which was a new idea in the 
deception detection field. Levine and his colleagues had promising results increasing 
deception detection accuracy, which the current study seeks to replicate and expand to 
different populations. A previous version of this research project was conducted at NPS 
by Lindsey, Kun, and Whaley in 2015, which replicated Levine et al.’s findings with both 
U.S. and international military members. One significant drawback to the previous 
research at NPS was a small sample size of international military officers. The current 
study seeks to add to and replicate the research with international military officers. 
Additionally, the current study expands on research by Park et al. (2002) on how people 
detect lies in their day-to-day interactions. Replicating these two studies examines the 
degree to which previous findings can generalize to the international military community. 
1. Deception Detection Accuracy 
Meta-analytic results indicate these methods yield accuracy is slightly better than 
chance, 53.46% per Bond and DePaulo (2006). This falls in line with most law 
enforcement training, which focuses on “triggers” or “clusters,” when individuals change 
their body position or twitch an eye. This can also include “grooming,” in which people 
subconsciously clean themselves from things that are not there or touch their faces. These 
nonverbal actions are viewed as possible indicators a subject might be deceptive. These 
types of indicators are only reinforced by hit TV crime shows, which often show these 
behaviors as signs of deception. However, when Bond and DePaulo’s (2006) findings are 
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observed, one can learn through the meta-analysis of 208 deception detection studies that 
by using nonverbal cues, deception detection accuracy is still around 50%.  
The first study replicates Levine et al.’s (2014) methods but in an international 
military officer context. Levine et al. (2014) introduced the idea of diagnostic utility to 
deception detection. “Diagnostic utility is a scalable level upon which an individual uses 
information to form a correct conclusion” (Lindsey et al., 2015, p. 2). By using the 
diagnostic utility questioning method, Levine et al. was able to achieve an accuracy rate 
of 70%, well above the status quo of around 50%. This research project surmises that by 
duplicating Levine et al.’s study conducted in 2014, the results will achieve similar 
accuracy rates and confirm the previous studies’ findings while being able to replicate 
similar rates with international military officers who use English as a second language.  
2. How People Really Detect Lies 
A key question around deception detection is how people truly detect lies in their 
day-to-day lives, especially in work environments. Because most of the current research 
has been on verbal or nonverbal cues, this was an area that was widely untouched. In 
2002, Park et al. looked at how individuals determine when somebody had lied to them. 
Park and her colleagues found most people relied on third-party information to help them 
uncover deception. As a consequence, this normally delays the timeframe in which a lie 
is detected, which goes against the assumption people detect lies in real-time. The 
timeframe for deception detection ranged from months to years; an extremely small 
percentage of people identified the deceptive message immediately, a finding replicated 
by Lindsey, Dunbar, and Russell (2011) in organizational settings. Park et al.’s (2002) 
study found people routinely look at information provided by other individuals, the 
consistency of statements, and if the deceivers’ statements coincided with physical 
evidence. Based on the previous findings of Park et al. (2002) and Lindsey et al. (2011), 
Study 2 examines how international military officers detect lies in their work 
environments. 
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3. The Current Studies 
Study 1 is a replication of the Levine et al.’s (2014) sixth study and expands upon 
their research by looking at international military officers to determine if such a 
replication would yield the same results. The second study replicates Park et al.’s (2002) 
method to examine how international military officers detect lies day-to-day in the work 
place. These data will aid in working closely with allied partners on interrogations and 
counterintelligence operations. This should garner better relationships with these partners 
and enable the sharing of best practices in order to keep borders safe. 
B. PURPOSE 
The intent of this research project is to replicate prior studies in deception 
detection accuracy and determine how people detect lies in order to either validate or 
invalidate previous findings as they apply to the international military community. This is 
done by collecting both qualitative and quantitative data. Qualitatively, Study 1 looks into 
when and how deception is discovered. Quantitatively, Study 2 looks into the specific 
questioning methods employed and how they affect deception detection accuracy.   
1. Study 1: Content and Contextual Questioning Effects on Accuracy 
Study 1 aims to continue the research into diagnostic utility and how it affects the 
ability to accurately detect deception. By replicating Levine et al.’s 2014 study, the 
authors are able to show a consistent higher deception detection accuracy rating with 
international military officers. This should support the previous findings and show the 
questioning methods employed have a direct effect on deception detection accuracy.  
2. Study 2: How People Really Detect Lies 
Study 2 is aimed at understanding how international military officers detect lies. 
This research project ascertains at what point on a time scale international military 
officers detect deception.    
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C. OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this research project is to provide a thorough but concise review 
of the current issues that have previously been identified and discussed in regard to how 
deception is detected. This project is not an all-inclusive research effort, but places 
emphasis on diagnostic utility and how individuals detect lies. Data is analyzed with the 
primary emphasis on deception detection accuracy using the different content-in-context 
approach. The first study places an emphasis on the role of the most popular, specific 
question strategies coupled with expertise (honing in on participants with previous 
experience with interviews or interrogations) and accuracy by utilizing Levine et al.’s 
(2014) research on diagnostic utility. Some participants have been fortunate to gain 
deception detection experience, whether through formal training or primary job 
responsibilities. Of those who have deception detection training, some also have 
experience and first-hand knowledge with what deceptive indicators can be comprised of.  
The objective of the second study strives to replicate Park et al.’s (2002) research on what 
types of evidence-gathering techniques participants use to determine if they have been 
deceived. When analyzing the second study, the authors investigate and make a 
determination on what methods individuals chose to use in their past experiences with 
deception detection. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research project and the previous research efforts are an extension and 
replication of Levine et al.’s (2014) and Park et al.’s (2002) studies. The goal of the 
associated studies is to determine if Levine et al.’s (2014), Park et al.’s (2002), and 
others’ results are applicable on a broader scale other than college students and law 
enforcement officers. The research efforts presented in this project calls attention to the 
useful information in determining techniques and questioning methods relevant to 
military operations. Specifically, this research project aims to answer the following 
research questions using content and contextual questioning methods (primary questions 
were replicated from Lindsey et al., 2015, p. 5): 
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1. Primary Questions  
• Utilizing the diagnostic utility methods of content and contextual 
questioning presented in the Levine et al. (2014) study, are 
international military officers able to distinguish deception with 
greater accuracy than the previous meta-analysis mean of 54%?  
• Utilizing the Park et al. (2002) method, what types of information 
do international military officers report using when detecting lies 
in the workplace? 
2. Secondary Question 
• Does this study replicate previous NPS findings by Lindsey, 
Skidmore, and Ortiz (2014) and Lindsey, Kun, and Whaley 
(2015)? 
E. SCOPE 
For Study 1, following Lindsey et al.’s (2015, p. 5) methodology, the authors 
analyzed “international military officers’ ability to detect deception when presented with 
high-stakes interviews” wherein a portion of those interviewed were deceptive. 
Specifically, Study 1 analyzes the roles of multiple questioning strategies and how the 
self-assessed experts of the participants (expert versus non-expert) performed in their 
accuracy levels. Study 2 explores what information participants used to identify 
deception in past experiences, and how long it took for them to uncover the deception. 
This research project extends and replicates both Levine et al. (2014) and Park et al. 
(2002) to determine if the concepts are applicable to a different study population other 
than civilian sector, Study 2 focused on international military officers at NPS. 
Additionally, the results from Study 1 and Study 2 could be beneficial in highlighting 
new information regarding deception detection techniques which could aid in defector 
questioning and the ability to detect deception for counterintelligence operations.   
F. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
This section covers the assumptions made during these studies and the limitations 
of the research and its findings. 
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1. Assumptions 
As explained by both Levine et al. (2014) and Bond and DePaulo (2006), the past 
predications of their research indicate their findings were not chance occurrences. The 
current research project operates on the premise that international military officers are 
distinct from populations used in previous research efforts. International military officers 
have a cultural emphasis on being truthful, and based on their respective cultures, any 
purposeful deception would bring an onset of stress and would be able to be observed. To 
bolster evidentiary findings from Study 1, Study 2 focuses on Park et al. (2002) research 
along with work completed by Lindsey, Skidmore, and Ortiz (2014). The main 
assumption in Study 2 is, as Lindsey et al. (2011) contended, “in reality, people do not 
discover lies for days, weeks, or even months, and deception is typically revealed by a 
third party, making nonverbal cues leaked during deception quite irrelevant” (Lindsey et 
al., 2011, p.61). 
2. Limitations 
For Study 1, following Lindsey et al.’s (2015, p. 6) methodology, the current 
research does not cover “any psychological factors such as mood, temperament, or any 
other conditions [that] might affect participants’ responses.”  Also, participants in the 
current studies were not placed in a situation where they had to expeditiously determine 
the identify of deception individual allowing for additional time to observe the 
individuals in question. Additionally, this meant at no time the participants neither were 
at personal risk nor got a reward for each right or wrong assessment. No financial 
constraints limited the authors in their ability to collect data, as well as all participants 
volunteered to partake in the studies.  
G. ORGANIZATION 
This research project is organized into two separate studies and follows Lindsey et 
al.’s (2015) methodology to answer the research questions. Chapters II–V include the 
background history and literature review, the methodology, and the results of Study 1. 
Study 1 replicates the idea of diagnostic utility based on Levine et al.’s (2014) research. 
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Specifically, this research project wanted to analyze the role of expertise on detection 
deception accuracy. Chapter II is the literature review, which shows most research up 
until recently has focused on verbal and nonverbal indicators. Chapter III provides the 
methodology for Study 1, how it was set up, information on the participants, and what 
procedures were used. Chapter IV presents the results of Study 1. Chapter V discusses the 
results of Study 1 through the findings and the limitations of Study 1. Chapters VI–IX 
encompass Study 2. Study 2 replicates Park et al.’s (2002) research on individuals’ ability 
to identify lies during normal, everyday activities. Chapter VI is the literature review that 
details what Park et al.’s (2002) research found and how people actually detect lies in 
their day-to-day interactions. Chapter VII provides the methodology for Study 2 which 
includes like Chapter III how it was set up, information on the participants, and what 
procedures were used. Chapter VIII shows the results of Study 2. Chapter IX discusses 
the results of Study 1 through the findings and the limitations of Study 2. Chapter X, is an 
overall summary of the conclusions as well as the authors’ recommendations for further 
deception detection research. 
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II. STUDY 1: BACKGROUND HISTORY / LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
From the beginning of when humans started interacting and communicating with 
one another, it can be reasonably deduced both honesty and deception have been involved 
in daily interactions amongst one another. Across the world, many have wished for peace, 
honesty, respect and the “golden rule” of treating others as you wish to be treated. Today, 
it is safe to say everyone wishes this would be the unwritten rule, not the exception. 
Regardless of why people decide to be truthful and honest with one another, the value of 
the techniques used to decipher when someone was being deceptive have varied over the 
years. According to the Intelligence Science Board (2006), this is either because the 
mechanism’s validity drew recurrent rejection or for policy reasons. Deception antidotes 
such as “truth serums” were sold in the past in an effort to keep a perceived non-honest 
person from telling a lie. Additionally, there have been attempts to implement polygraphs 
into court cases as evidence when someone was suspected of being deceptive. On the 
other side of the spectrum, people pay to be deceived when they buy tickets to a 
magicians’ show or when they visit a haunted house. All of these examples go to show 
deception has a place in daily life, whether the deception is known to the individual or 
not. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DECEPTION DETECTION 
For hundreds of years, people have looked for credible ways to detect deception. 
Some of the earliest efforts to detect deception occurred in the Hindu and Chinese 
cultures. Those who were accused of lying were asked to place a grain of rice in their 
mouth for a short period, and then spit it out. According to research conducted by Elley 
(2001) in ancient China, those looking to catch a liar had the accused spit out a small 
serving of rice and the dry rice grains, if any when spat, would indicate the dry mouth of 
a liar. This method was seen as primitive and abecedarian; however, brings to light the 
central assumption people often make when detecting lies which is, “the psychological 
state of lying can be detected by the observation of physiological signs” (To, 2003). 
There have been three prominent physiological signs recorded that indicate when a 
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person is telling the truth. To further explained, “cardiovascular activity was the first sign 
to be associated with lying” (To, 2003). This discovery, according to research by Geddes 
(2002), was annotated by a famous Italian criminologist by the name of Cesare Lombroso 
in the late 19th century. Lombroso discovered when a subject gave untruthful answers, 
his or her blood pressure and heart rate would intensify. Lombroso went on to create 
devices such as the Plethysmograph and the Sphygmograph. To use these devices, “a 
subject wore airtight volumetric gloves that connected to a rubber membrane. This 
activated a pen that rolled over the surface of a smoked drum. The speed of the pen 
varied with the subject’s blood flow” (Geddes, 2002, pp. 97-100). The thought was when 
a person was being deceptive, “the stress of deception affected the subject’s heart rate 
and blood pressure. By observing the deviations traced by the pen, an investigator or 
observer would see when and if the subject was lying. In the 1910s, some studies 
suggested the ratio of time taken to inhale and exhale changed when a subject lied” 
(Geddes, 2002, pp. 97-100). Using this concept, coupled with Lombroso’s discovery, 
“John Larson invented the first polygraph in 1921 while he was a medical student 
working for the Berkeley Police Department” (Elley, 2001). Geddes (2002) further 
explained the first polygraph mapped out a subject's blood pressure and respiration at the 
same time. Larson's hypothesis was that abnormalities in the fluctuation of a subject’s 
blood pressure and breathing patterns would indicate deception. Elley (2001) added the 
third physiological indicator used in modern polygraphs, was termed “skin resistance” 
and was later added in the 1920s by Leonarde Keeler.  According to To (2002), Keeler 
deduced a lying subject would sweat more than a truthful subject, which in turn, “would 
decrease skin resistance due to a higher concentration of negatively charged chloride ions 
on the surface of the skin” (To, 2003). When scientists learned of this, they added in this 
additional measurement for detecting deception and, in doing so, they hoped it would 
eliminate any erroneous mistakes made during the polygraph exam. Since the addition of 
this method to the polygraph process, no improvements or findings have been made to 
improve the ability or the veracity of the polygraph examination.  
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Previous research involving nonverbal cues indicated the reliance on nonverbal 
cues has resulted in accuracy rates which are not better than 50/50 or “not much different 
than chance” (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Levine et al., 2014). 
More recent research sought to improve human deception detection accuracy by 
focusing on diagnostic utility, “or the degree to which information is useful as prompted 
through strategic questioning” (Lindsey et al., 2014; Lindsey et al., 2015; Levine et al., 
2014). For decades, deception detection research placed an emphasis on the physiological 
mannerisms of the subject being evaluated and the nonverbal cues were typically 
“indicative” of being deceptive. This research is an extension and replication of Levine et 
al. (2014) and Lindsey et al. (2015), based on diagnostic utility relating to deception 
detection. The previous studies insinuated that contextual message content consisting of 
plausibility associated with fact is the ultimate influence of a person’s perception in 
deception detection. 
B. REVIEW OF PREVIOUS DECEPTION DETECTION ACCURACY 
STUDIES 
Levine et al. (2014) examined diagnostic utility and how it might play into higher 
deception detection rates. Levine et al. explained the manner in which “a potentially 
deceptive interviewee is questioned may impact veracity judgments, detection accuracy, 
coded verbal and nonverbal responses, or some combination of these outcomes” (Levine 
et al., 2014, p. 263). This research has found the manner in which a subject is questioned, 
especially the way questions were asked, impacted the deception detection accuracy by 
the investigator. Improving deception detection accuracy is ultimately the goal for law 
enforcement, business, or in the case of military operations, possible defector 
interrogations or counterintelligence operations.  
The diagnostic utility approach differs from previous deception detection theories. 
Previous research focused on how subjects felt during questioning: the subjects’ stress 
levels, the subjects’ cognitive efforts, and subjects’ ability to maintain control through 
questioning. The culmination of findings ultimately led to a slightly higher than chance 
deception detection rating. Furthermore, the other studies focused on how the investigator 
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viewed the subject and focused on probing effects, truth-bias, and investigator training. 
None of these previous studies focused on the way questions were framed and if the 
diagnostic utility approach could obtain better deception detection accuracy. Levine et al. 
(2014) pointed out “diagnostic utility also includes consideration of contextualized 
message content including plausibility and correspondence with known facts” (Levine et 
al., 2014, p. 264). 
The diagnostic utility method of research requires more exploration in order to 
determine if Levine et al.’s findings can be replicated and extended to other populations. 
Levine et al.’s findings had the highest accuracy among deception detection research, and 
one key question regarding these and other study results centers around the role of 
expertise in deception detection. Levine believed “an expert’s training, experience, and 
motivation should provide an advantage over the typical college student untrained in the 
specific context or any context” (Levine et al., 2014, p. 266). This would become 
apparent when comparing experts (those who have received formal 
interrogation/interviewing training) and non-experts’ deception judgments. Levine et al.’s 
study found on the third set of questions students were actually more accurate than 
experts (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Deception Detection Accuracy Rates. Adapted from Levine 
et al. (2014). 
 Set one Set two Set three 
Experts 29.2% 64.3% 72.4% 
Non-experts 39.2% 66.6% 72.9% 
   
The previous iteration of this research project found experts had a higher 
deception detection rate over students. Table 2 shows the findings from Lindsey et al. 
(2015). 
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Table 2. Deception Detection Accuracy Rates. Adapted from 
Lindsey et al. (2015). 
 Set one Set two Set three 
Experts 31.3% 54.2% 70.8% 
Non-experts 36.2% 50.0% 63.8% 
 
The findings on deception detection between experts and non-experts varied for 
Lindsey et al. (2015) and Levine et al. (2014). The results of Study 1 shed additional light 
on deception detection rates between experts and non-experts.  
C. STUDY DESIGN 
Study 1 design replicates the methodology employed by Lindsey et al. (2015):  
Study 1 was a 3x2 mixed design with the three sets of questions (presented 
in Table 6) as a repeated factor, the two levels of expertise (expert versus 
non-expert) as an independent groups variable, and detection accuracy as 
the dependent variable. Expertise was operationally defined using 
participants’ answers to the following question: “Have you ever conducted 
interviewing or interrogation as a regular part of your job?” Participants 
who answered “No” were coded as non-expert; those who answered “Yes” 
were coded as experts. An additional question asked “Have you ever 
received formal interviewing or interrogation training?” wherein only 25% 
of participants had received such training; therefore, the sample size was 
too small to make meaningful comparisons in the current study using this 
question as a proxy for expertise. Participant answers (their truth/lie 
judgments) were scored for accuracy by adding the number of correct 
judgments and dividing by the total number of judgments. 
Each participant watched and rated 12 videotaped interviews of different 
students denying cheating. The 12 interviews used for this research were 
the same interviews that were used in Levine et al.’s (2014) sixth study. 
For each of the question sets, two dishonest interview segments were 
shown. For each deceptive interview, a corresponding honest interview 
was selected by matching the sex, race, and approximate physical 
appearance of the interviewee. Thus, there were two honest non-cheaters 
and two lying cheaters, all of whom denied cheating, interviewed with 
each of the three question sets (Lindsey et al., 2015, pp. 10-11). 
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D. RATIONALE FOR STUDYING DECEPTION DETECTION ACCURACY 
OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY OFFICERS 
The author’s chose to study international military officers because these men and 
women have myriad areas of expertise and specialties, some of which include 
intelligence and counter-intelligence. International military officers originate from 
cultural or ethnic environments different from those found in the United States, which is 
often overlooked. The relevancy of detecting deception is practical in normal day-to-day 
activities. As representatives of the government, military members are often held to a 
higher standard of conduct. The expected behavior from military members encompasses 
making sound decisions based on their morals and ethics, which in turn, strengthens an 
observer’s truth bias and the willingness to accept more daily communication from the 
military as truth opposed to deception. In the military, integrity and honor are the biggest 
drivers for behavior both on and off duty. Both military and civilians assume military 
members can be trusted more than civilians due to the rigidity and discipline acquired 
from military training. However, the question here is not whom one can trust more, but 
how accurate international military officers are at detecting deception. When dealing with 
international military officers, it is important to consider cultural differences dictate their 
behavior within their specific set of morals. However, the way deception can be detected 
may or may not be uniform across these different cultures; this is what Study 1 
revalidates. In addition, while some specialties in the military provide training and 
education on how to detect deception, it would be interesting to investigate the quality 
and breadth of the training received amongst international military officers. Although the 
training international military officers receive may differentiate in quality compared to 
the training received by U.S. military officers, this can be an additional research topic for 
further study. This project seeks to discover whether international military officers’ 
performance in deception detection translates into a qualitative and quantitative product 
consisting of probative information.  
The research conducted by Buller, Burgoon, Buslig, and Roiger (1998) titled 
Interpersonal Deception Theory: Examining Deception from a Communication 
Perspective, is the academic vehicle used for the basis of this research and acts as a segue 
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between deception detection and the various military communities. In this four-year 
project, the report examined the behavior of gathering intelligence and explored how 
observers detect deception in various environments and whether or not they were in an 
academic, scientific, or other abnormal behavior inducing setting. Regardless of setting, 
Buller et al. (1998) further stated, as indicated by the “Interpersonal Deception Theory 
(IDT), deception is a communicative event, rather than a psychological phenomenon” 
(Buller et al.,1998, p. ii). It is in the U.S. military’s interest to learn deception detection 
best practices from experienced international military officers. The learning which would 
transpire between domestic and international militaries would bolster alliances and build 
trust and transparency in future allied operations.  
Other rationale for accounting for the abilities of international military officers 
was based on research conducted by Cheng and Broadhurst (2005) in their publication 
“The Detection of Deception: The Effects of First and Second Language on Lie Detection 
Ability.” This work explains how language barriers can sway observers’ ability to detect 
deception. This experiment demonstrates observers possess the ability to detect deception 
better when presented material in their secondary language versus their primary language. 
This experiment also highlights it is difficult to determine whether subjects are being 
truthful when they use a second language versus their primary language. The research 
gathered in this project relies on deception detection in the participants’ second language 
(English); however, caution is advised, as the participants’ ability to detect deception in 
their first language may be different when compared to the previous deception detection 
accuracy research by Lindsey et al. (2014) and Lindsey et al. (2015). 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Since this research is an extension of the previously mentioned works, the 
research questions were adopted verbatim from research conducted by Lindsey et al. 
2015.  
Study 1 is based on the qualitative replication of the methodology used in 
Levine et al. (2014). Utilizing the diagnostic utility methods of content 
and contextual questioning presented in the Levine et al. (2014) study, are 
international military officers able to distinguish deception with greater 
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accuracy than the previous meta-analysis mean of 54% and, if so, to what 
degree? 
If the study holds true to the findings of Levine et al. (2014), then the 
authors should find a mean accuracy in excess of 54% and improvement 
most likely greater than 70%, with a corresponding minimal effect for 
expert judgments. Should the replication prove false, further research will 
be required to examine which portion of the study does not hold true in the 
chosen sample and to what amount modification will need to occur. The 
next chapter fully details the methodology used in Study 1. (Lindsey et al., 
2015, p. 12). 
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III. STUDY 1: METHODOLOGY 
This study is a replication of previous work and a follow-on to Lindsey et al. 
(2015) designed to increase sample sizes, in order to allow for statistically valid 
conclusions. Because the current study collected participant data in an identical manner 
to Lindsey et al. (2015) and because study methodology must be reported precisely and 
specifically, this chapter presents the same methodological information as Lindsey et al. 
(2015) adapted and updated to reflect the current study’s specific participant data:  
In order to replicate the sixth experiment in Levine et al. (2014) in an 
appropriately clinical method, the authors first sought approval of NPS’s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the Protection of Human Subjects. 
The authors completed the mandated IRB ethically-based training and all 
additional reviews and subsequently received approval to initiate research. 
All research occurred on campus in specially designated rooms designed 
to best replicate the atmosphere of the initial study. Daily findings and 
survey materials were maintained under secure conditions, no personally 
identifiable information (PII) was collected, and no leakage of 
demographics occurred. (Lindsey et al., 2015, p. 13) 
A. PARTICIPANTS 
The framework for describing the participants has been replicated from Lindsey et 
al. (2015), while figures specific to this study have been inserted to reflect current work: 
The participants were 52 international military officers studying in 
resident programs at NPS. Tables 3, 4, and 5 summarize each participant’s 
country, rank, and branch of service, respectively. Participants’ ages 
ranged from 25-45 (Mean [M] = 35.31, Standard Deviation [SD] = 5.20) 
and years of military service ranged from 3-25 (M = 15.12, SD = 6.20).  
The volunteer participants represented a total of 23 countries (see Table 3 
and Figure 1). Due to a low sample size and some countries and regions 
being represented by only one participant, a comparative analysis based on 
language, behavioral, and cultural norms was not able to be conducted. 
Also, 84.6% were male, 71.2% identified themselves as Caucasian/White, 
21.2% identified themselves as Asian/Pacific Islander, 5.8% identified 
themselves as Hispanic/Latino(a), and 5.8% identified themselves as 
African/Black. In terms of expertise, 25% indicated they had received 
formal interviewing or interrogation training, and 28.8% reported that they 
had conducted interviewing or interrogation as a regular part of their jobs. 
All participants volunteered their participation, and none received any 
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form of compensation for their involvement in this research. Participation 
was anonymous, with the only demographic information collected being 
country of origin, gender, age, race, rank, (see Table 4 and Figure 2), years 
of military service, military branch, (see Table 5 and Figure 3), and 
level/use of interrogation training. (Lindsey et al., 2015, p. 13) 
Table 3. Participants’ Country of Origin 
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Figure 1. Participants’ Country of Origin 
Table 4. Participants’ Military Rank 
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Note. Rank was operationalized using U.S. equivalent ranks. 
Figure 2. Participants’ Military Rank 
Table 5. Participants’ Branch of Service 
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Figure 3. Participants’ Branch of Service 
B. MATERIALS 
The framework for describing the materials has been replicated from Lindsey et 
al. (2015) to ensure accuracy and continuity; for the same reasons Table 6 has been 
replicated as well: 
The experimental stimuli in this research are twelve videotaped interview 
segments—all used in the sixth study of Levine et al. (2014) on diagnostic 
utility and expertise. Each segment showed a university student being 
interviewed about cheating in a research-related trivia game. All students 
in the 12 segments denied cheating, but half (six) actually cheated. Thus, 
the 12 video segments resulted in six honest students telling the truth (they 
denied cheating and they, in fact, did not cheat), and six dishonest students 
lying (they cheated, but they denied it in the interview). See Levine et al. 
(2014, pp. 270–272) for a detailed description of how the experimental 
videotapes were created. The 12 interview segments represented three 
different diagnostic utility questioning strategies (see Table 6). (Lindsey et 
al., 2015, p. 15) 
  
62% 
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11% 2% 
Participants' Branch of Service 
Branch
Army
Navy
Air Force
Marines
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Table 6. Questions Asked in the Three Sets of Cheating Tapes. 
Source: Levine et al. (2014, p. 268). 
First Question Set 
1. Did you find the trivia questions difficult? 
2. Was team work much of a factor? How so, please explain. 
3. In looking at your score, you did better than other groups. Does this surprise you? 
4. How would you explain your success? 
5. Did cheating occur when I left the room? 
6. Why should I believe you? 
Second Question Set 
1. How much experience have you had working in teams? 
2. Have you played trivial pursuit games before? 
3. How often do you play? [follow-up] Why do you/ don’t you play them much? 
4. In the current game, did you find the questions difficult? [follow-up] If you were 
    going to scale it on a scale of 1 to 10, what would you say they were in terms of 
    difficulty? 
5. Was teamwork much of a factor in your performance? 
6. What would you say if I told you that you did better than other groups? 
7. How would you explain your performance? 
8. Did you cheat when the experimenter left the room? 
9. Are you telling me the truth? 
10. What would your partner say if I asked them the same question? 
Third Question Set 
1. Tell me, in as much detail as you can, what happened during the trivia game? 
2. How well did you do on in the trivia game? 
3. Which questions did you and your partner get right? 
4. For the answers you got right, explain how you knew the right answer? 
5. In detail, what happened when the experimenter left the room? 
6. Did any cheating occur? 
7. When I interview your partner, what will they say about cheating? 
8. Did you and your partner discuss cheating? 
9. If someone did cheat, what should happen to them? 
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C. PROCEDURE 
The procedures followed were identical to the procedures used by Lindsey et al. 
(2015): 
Participants entered a lab setting at which point they read and completed a 
consent document. After consenting to participate, each respondent 
individually watched a series of 12 videotaped interview segments lasting 
approximately two minutes apiece. After each segment, the participant 
paused the video for as long as necessary to make a truth/lie judgment 
regarding the individual in the video (see Appendix for full questionnaire 
for Studies 1 and 2). Participants also answered a series of demographic 
questions. (Lindsey et al., 2015, p. 16) 
D. DATA ANALYSIS APPROACH 
Following upon Lindsey et al. (2015, p. 16), “data was analyzed using mixed-
model multivariate analysis of variance where question strategy was the repeated factor 
and expertise was the between factor, with accuracy as the dependent variable. Effect 
sizes were also reported.”   
Most of the observed population identified as Caucasian/White; this corresponds 
with NPS’s latest ethnicity/race demographics report from 2013 (Naval Postgraduate 
School Center for Excellence, 2013). Similar to the findings of Lindsey et al. (2015), 
small group sizes for races other than Caucasian/White did not allow for statistical 
analysis between groups. As with race/ethnicity, participants’ gender was also in keeping 
with the aforementioned demographics report.  
“The sample was comprised of a diverse range of military ranks centered 
predominately on mid-career officers (O-3 through O-5) and also included some O–2 and 
O–6 officers” (Lindsey et al., 2015, p. 18), which aligns with the overall demographics of 
the school (Naval Postgraduate School Center for Excellence, 2013). This could be 
because countries want to make sure their service members are committed to the military 
before sending them to NPS, resulting in primarily seasoned officers attending the school.  
The sample contained an assortment of military branches, though the majority of 
participants served in the Army. This loosely followed NPS’s represented population 
(Naval Postgraduate School Center for Excellence, 2013). 
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IV. STUDY 1: RESULTS 
This study is a replication of previous work and a follow-on to Lindsey et al. 
(2015). The statistical analyses required to answer the current research questions are 
identical to Lindsey et al. (2015). Because statistical analyses are very specific and must 
be reported with precision, this chapter presents the same statistical analytic information 
as Lindsey et al. (2015), replicated and updated to reflect the current study’s data and 
results: 
The data were analyzed with a 3x2 mixed analysis of variance with the 
three question sets as a repeated factor, the two levels of expertise (expert 
versus non-expert, n = 15 and n = 37, respectively) as an independent 
groups variable, and detection accuracy (percent correct) as the dependent 
variable. 
Consistent with Levine et al. (2014), Study 1 replicated the strong main 
effect for questioning strategy, F(2, 100) = 17.42, p < .001, η2 = .26, but 
not a main effect for expertise, F(1, 50) = 0.562, p = .46. One should note 
that the main effect for expertise found by Levine et al. was trivial (η2 = 
.01). Although Levine et al. found a statistically significant question type x 
expertise interaction, the current study did not (the effect size for Levine et 
al.’s interaction finding was small, with η2 = .01). Specifically, the 
question by expertise interaction in the current study was not statistically 
significant, F (2, 100) = 0.28, p = 0.75. 
The cell means are presented in Table 7. Across experts and non-experts, 
accuracy was 35.7% (95% CI = ± 4.0%), 54.7% (95% CI = ± 4.5%), and 
69.8% (95% CI = ± 3.3%) for question sets 1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
Accuracy means in the question set 1 and question set 3 cells were 
significantly different from the 54% meta-analysis mean at p < .01. 
Accuracy means for question set 2 were not significantly different from 
the meta-analytic mean of 54%. (Lindsey et al., 2015, pp. 21-22) 
Table 7. Mean Accuracy (and Standard Deviations) by Condition, 
Study 1 
Question Set Set One Set Two Set Three 
Expert 35.0% (20.7%) 56.7% (22.1%) 73.3% (24.0%) 
Non-expert 36.5% (28.0%) 52.7% (31.6%) 66.2% (20.6%) 
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The data were further analyzed using a 3x2 mixed analysis of variance 
with the three question sets as a repeated factor, two levels of training 
(whether or not participants had ever received formal interviewing and 
interrogation training; n = 13 and n = 39, respectively) as the independent 
groups variable, and detection accuracy (percent correct) as the dependent 
variable. 
Consistent with Study 1’s previous results, Levine et al.’s (2014) findings 
were replicated such that a strong main effect was observed for 
questioning strategy, F(2, 100) = 14.91, p < .001, η2 = .23, but was not 
their main effect for training, though it approached significance, F(1, 50) = 
3.31, p = .08. The question by training interaction was not statistically 
significant, F (2, 100) = 0.28, p = 0.75. 
The cell means are presented in Table 8. Across trained and untrained 
participants, accuracy was 34.3% (95% CI = ± 4.2%), 50.1% (95% CI = ± 
4.6%), and 67.3% (95% CI = ± 3.5%) for question sets 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. Accuracy means in all but one cell was significantly different 
from the 54% meta-analysis mean at p < .01. Accuracy means for question 
set 2 with no formal training were consistent with the meta-analytic mean 
of 54%. (Lindsey et al., 2015, pp. 21-22) 
Table 8. Mean Accuracy (and Standard Deviations) by Condition, 
Study 1 
Question Set Set One Set Two Set Three 
Formal Training 30.8% (23.2%) 44.2% (20.8%) 65.4% (28.0%) 
No Formal Training 37.8% (26.8%) 57.1% (30.9%) 69.2% (19.4%) 
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V. STUDY 1: DISCUSSION, FINDINGS, LIMITATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON ANALYSIS 
The results of study 1 replicated the research of Levine et al. (2014) and Lindsey 
et al. (2015) and showed an increased mean accuracy rate by question set as the question 
sets increased in utility of content and context. The increased accuracy rate not only leads 
one to see the importance of content and contextual questioning methods, but also 
validates the previous results.  
A. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS 
The findings of Study 1 bring out three prominent discussion points. First, 
participants who had no formal training did better in all question sets compared to 
participants who had formal training, although this finding was not statistically 
significant. This means people who had no training whatsoever did better than those who 
had training. This finding could be due in part to the quality of their training. Most 
training people receive is in person, however, the issue lies in honing in on the wrong 
predictors, specifically nonverbal cues. This will lead an observer to pay more attention 
to what the subject is conveying through body language rather than what is actively being 
said. Additionally, truth-biases can develop or intensify with familiarities seen in others, 
especially when interviewers or observers were suspicious as seen in Buller et al.’s 
(1998) report. Also, if a subject spoke with conviction, a truth-bias was also developed, 
as witnessed in further research conducted by Buller et al. (1998), which could 
potentially mislead an observer into thinking someone was being truthful, when in fact 
they were being deceptive. A lie-bias could also be developed by an observer who has 
had formal training, per Buller et al. (1998) studies, which indicate an observer could 
already be suspicious of deceptive behavior from a subject being interviewed. 
 Second, participants who are considered experts performed better than Levine et 
al.’s (2014) findings, although it was not statically significant. Third, the mean accuracy 
rate was shown to improve with each question set, thus bolstering Levine et al.’s (2014) 
theory of utility in content and contextual questioning methods. This further illustrates 
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the questioning method is more important than over any training someone might have 
received. By replicating Levine et al. (2014) with international military officers, Levine 
et al.’s (2014) findings have more credence because the results span multiple cultures. 
Based on the findings across cultures, the U.S. military can establish common ground on 
how to work with our partners in conducting defector interrogations as well as 
counterintelligence operations. 
The researchers’ replication of Levine et al.’s (2014, p. 23) “content and 
contextual questioning methods demonstrated an increase in expert participant’s accuracy 
to 73.3% and non-expert participant to 66.2%”. The expert accuracy rate of 73.3% was 
higher than Levine et al. (2014) as seen in Table 1 and Lindsey et al. (2015), (see Table 
2), but not as high as Lindsey et al. (2014), (see Table 9). These findings in Study 1 also 
easily outperform Bond and DePaulo’s (2006) finding of a mean accuracy rate of 54%. 
As for the participants with no formal training out-performing the experts, there are some 
theories in Buller et al.’s (1998) report which support truth basis, honesty effect, and 
probing effect which may help explain this finding. The importance of these numbers 
show even though someone is considered an expert, they may not be getting the highest 
deception detection rate. The main linkage to deception detection is the question method 
chosen to be employed. By using diagnostic utility both experts and non-experts get 
much higher deception detection rate. This is the single most important finding to take 
away from this data.  
Table 9. Mean Accuracy (and Standard Deviation) by Condition. 
Adapted from Lindsey et al. (2014). 
 Set one Set two Set three 
Experts 36.0% (23.2%) 66.2% (22.9%) 75.7% (22.6%) 
Non-experts 39.0% (26.8%) 69.5% (23.3%) 81.0% (22.3%) 
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B. LIMITATIONS 
The cultural and sociological differences amongst international military officers 
were not accounted for during this research project as compared to U.S. military officers 
in other studies such as Lindsey et al. (2014) and Lindsey et al. (2015) studies. The 
backgrounds of the participants in this research project differed greatly as they came from 
various national, regional, political, and religious influences. The ability to fully 
comprehend English was not accounted for in this research project, as participants were 
not gauged individually on their aptitude for understanding the questions presented to 
them during the survey; however, all participants were international military officers at 
NPS and had passed the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) for admittance 
to their degree programs. The international military officers were also limited on the type 
of contextual questioning methods and scenarios. These scenarios were not a very good 
representation of what the international military officers were used to seeing or being 
exposed to in their normal military working environment. Despite this, detection 
accuracy improved greatly with the diagnostic utility of the questions. According to the 
NPS fact book (Naval Postgraduate School Annual Report and Fact book, 2015), as of 
peak quarter enrollment of summer 2015, there were 214 international military students 
on campus, yet this research received participation from 52 students. Although the 
sample size was small, proportionally, 24% is a good response rate for lab research.     
C. RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON ANALYSIS 
Based on the results obtained, the authors recommend using the methodology to 
further extend and replicate results. By completing an additional iteration of this research, 
a better understanding of how content and contextual questioning methods aid deception 
detection could be possible. Due to regional, cultural, and ethnic limitations, and to the 
limited participation of international military officers, an additional replication of this 
research project among additional international military officers should be conducted to 
solidify these results. By replicating Study 1, the international military officer findings 
can be proven to be sound when compared to this research project and to Levine et al. 
(2014). The findings in this research project highlight non-experts are shown to perform 
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better than experts given questions based on content and contextual questioning methods. 
The authors recommend Study 1 could be furthered by taking those participants who 
achieved high scores and giving them additional training in deception detection. This 
training can range from diagnostic utility to understanding biases’ interrogators bring into 
the interview room. By conducting this training for those who scored highest in Study 1, 
greater deception detection accuracy might be achieved. Once these participants have 
completed training, they should be given the same question sets to determine whether 
their accuracy rates improve.  
The next chapter introduces the second study, which focuses on which specific 
factors people use, in addition to verbal and nonverbal indicators, when making 
judgments about deception. 
 31 
VI. STUDY 2: BACKGROUND HISTORY / LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
Study 2 is based on Park et al.’s (2002) qualitative research into how people 
detect lies and how long it takes lies to be discovered. Study 2 highlights the most used 
methods to detect lies. The participants in Study 2 were asked to tell how they were able 
to detect a lie within a workplace environment. This allows the information gathered to 
not be tainted by a laboratory setting. Furthermore, this line of questioning reveals verbal 
and nonverbal cues and leakage in lie detection. Since Park et al.’s (2002) research was 
based on earlier research focusing on verbal and nonverbal cues, Study 2 was designed to 
replicate the research methods used in Park et al. (2002) in order to obtain more data to 
support or refute its findings.  
The idea of asking participants about deception detection in the workplace first 
appeared in Lindsey et al. (2011). Study 2 examines the relational aspects of deception 
detection, including the power dynamics of supervisors and subordinates. Study 2 delves 
into how subordinates lie to supervisors and how supervisors lie to subordinates. Lindsey 
et al. found “no lies were uncovered through the interpretation of nonverbal cues, rather 
they were discovered after the fact through evidence or confessions” (Lindsey et al., 
2011, p. 74). This could be through third-party information, physical information, or a 
combination of multiple factors.  Ultimately, verbal or nonverbal cues were not noticed at 
the time of the deception. Lindsey et al. (2015) replicated Lindsey et al. (2011), and the 
results implied the workplace environment has influencing factors in the attempt to 
replicate Study 2 within a highly charged military culture. “Both power and stakes are 
greatly increased because of the effects of after-the-fact evidence and a complete 
disregard for nonverbal variables” (Lindsey et al., 2015, p. 27). 
Park et al. (2002) helped shed light on how people detect deception, but it also 
made arguments as to what was wrong with the resounding research into verbal and 
nonverbal cues in deception. Park et al. (2002) listed faults of prior studies into verbal 
and nonverbal cues: 
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• judges in deception detection experiments did not know deception 
detection accuracy would be higher if subjects had idiosyncratic 
knowledge of the deceiver, 
• studies were done under everyday conditions and not under high-
stakes conditions,  
• the researcher either encouraged or sanctioned lies and,  
• the participants did not normally interact on a one-on-one basis.  
When conducting research into deception detection, researchers must be careful to factor 
in these potentially limiting influences in order to get quality results.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research project and the previous research efforts are an extension and 
replication of Park et al.’s (2002) and Lindsey et al.’s (2015) research. The goal of the 
Study 2 is to determine if Park et al.’s (2002) and Lindsey et al.’s (2015), results are 
applicable on a broader scale other than college students and law enforcement officers.  
Applying the methods used by Park et al. (2002), the authors seek to determine 
what type of information international military officers report using when detecting lies 
in non-research settings? The authors expect to collect data which should be indicative of 
previous data collected by Park et al. (2002). This data should indicate most participants 
found incriminating information after the fact, which led to the detection of deception. 
This would validate Park et al.’s (2002) argument that verbal and nonverbal cues are not 
heavily relied upon as suggested by other research.  
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VII. STUDY 2: METHODOLOGY 
This study is a replication of previous work and a follow-on to Lindsey et al. 
(2015) designed to increase sample sizes, in order to allow for statistically valid 
conclusions. Because the current study collected participant data in an identical manner 
to Lindsey et al. (2015) and because study methodology must be reported precisely and 
specifically, this chapter presents the same methodological information as Lindsey et al. 
(2015) adapted and updated to reflect the current study’s specific participant data:  
The authors sought approval from the NPS IRB for the Protection of 
Human Subjects prior to conducting Study 2. The IRB granted approval 
for completing Study 2 after the authors completed IRB mandated 
training. Upon initiating Study 2, the authors replicated Park et al. (2002), 
study in a controlled academic setting wherein volunteers filled out 
questionnaires to measure their perceptions about others’ communication 
through questionnaires. The questionnaires were maintained through 
positive control measures, which ensured that all responses given were 
kept anonymous and could not be linked to the participants’ identities. The 
questionnaires did not elicit any PII and only contained basic demographic 
information about the participants. Upon the completion of Study 2, two 
trained coders coded all completed questionnaires independently.  The 
coding observed in Park et al. (2002), study was replicated in Study 2, in 
which inter-coder reliability (Kappa) was calculated and all disagreements 
between coders were resolved through discussion between the coders. 
(Lindsey et al, 2015, p. 29) 
A. PARTICIPANTS 
The participants in Study 2 volunteered their time and effort without any pressure, 
coercion, or unlawful inducement. Participants were not awarded anything of value by 
providing their judgments or experiences. The sample for Study 2 included the same 
participants as Study 1. The participants were 52 international military officers who 
represented 23 countries and were actively enrolled as students at NPS.   
B. PROCEDURE 
The procedures followed were identical to the procedures used by Lindsey et al. 
(2015): In Study 2, adapted from Park et al. (2002), participants were specifically “asked 
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to recall a recent situation in which they had discovered that someone had lied to them. 
They were instructed to take time and recall as much information as they could about 
what happened” (p. 149), in order to provide as much detail as possible. Then participants 
were asked a series of questions (See Appendix), obtained from the protocol used in Park 
et al. (2002). (Lindsey et al., 2015, pp. 29-30) 
The participants were asked the following, specific, questions on how and 
when the deception took place from Park et al. (2002):  
1. Recall as much as you can about the situation in which the person 
originally lied to you. In as much detail as possible, describe the event 
where you were lied to: Where did it happen? What was the lie about? If 
you can, be sure to write down the exact thing that the person said to you. 
2. How long ago did this event (the lie) originally take place? 
3. What was/is the relationship between you and the person who lied to you? 
4. Now, think about how you found out that the person lied to you. Describe 
in as much detail as you can the events surrounding your discovery of the 
lie: How exactly did you find out that the person lied to you? 
C. CODING OF QUALITATIVE DATA 
The qualitative data obtained in Study 2 was coded into four separate categories:  
• How long ago did this situation take place,  
• the relationship between the participant and the deceptive subject,  
• the discovery method used in detecting the deception, and  
• the time-lapse between when the lie was told and when the participant 
found out about the lie.  
For the query about how long ago the person lied initially, the data were standardized into 
months. The time ranged from 0.033 months (1 day) to 84 months (7 years). The coding 
options for the relationship between the participant and the deceptive individual were 
adapted from Lindsey et al. (2015) which included the following categories: none, 
superior/immediate boss, “superior/above immediate boss, subordinate, child, spouse, 
immediate family member (brother, sister, mom, dad)” (p. 30), peer/friend, 
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teacher/caregiver, senior in rank/but no command relationship, stranger, customer, or 
investigator. The coding options for the discovery method were adapted from Lindsey et 
al. (2015), which were based on the following options: none, “3rd party information, 
physical information, solicited direct confession, unsolicited direct confession, at-the-
time verbal and/or nonverbal behavior, inconsistencies with prior knowledge, 
combination (two or more listed above)” (p. 30), assumption, investigation (acts to 
confirm a suspicion or accusation, different from “combination”), and suspicion. The 
coding options to determine the lapsed time from when the lie was told and the 
participant found out were adapted from Lindsey et al. (2015) which were classified as 
the following: none (if there was no positive answer provided), “immediate detection, 
less than one hour, less than one day, less than one week, less than one month, less than 
one year, more than one year” (pp. 30-31). The results section of this chapter contains 
further information on the usage of data collected. 
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VIII. STUDY 2: RESULTS 
This study is a replication of previous work and a follow-on to Lindsey et al. 
(2015). The statistical analyses required to answer the current research questions are 
identical to Lindsey et al. (2015). Because statistical analyses are very specific and must 
be reported with precision, this chapter presents the same statistical analytic information 
as Lindsey et al. (2015), replicated and updated to reflect the current study’s data and 
results: 
Frequency data show the most common discovery methods were third-
party information [31.0%] and physical information [20.7%]. The least 
common valid discovery methods were unsolicited direct confession 
[3.4%] and inconsistencies with prior knowledge [6.9%]. Table 10 
delineates these findings while Table 11 presents examples of the 
discovery methods (Lindsey et al., 2015, p. 33). 
Table 10. Frequency of Recalled Workplace Lie Discovery Methods. 
Adapted from Lindsey et al. (2015). 
Discovery Method f % 
Third Party Information 9 31.0% 
Physical Information 6 20.7% 
Verbal/Nonverbal Behavior 5 17.2% 
Combination 4 13.8% 
Inconsistencies with Prior Knowledge 2 6.9% 
Other 2 6.9% 
Unsolicited Direct Confession 1 3.4% 
Solicited Direct Confession 0 0.0% 
Total 29 100 
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Table 11. Examples of Discovery Method Categories. Source: 
Lindsey et al. (2015, p. 34). 
DISCOVERY METHOD Response Example 
 
Third-party Information 
A colleauge [sic] lied about getting married 
to a local woman while on an operation in 
the Balkans. His new spouse told me, in 
confidence, that they were married. 
 
Physical Information 
Going further into the investigation, the 
scanner in question was found at the 
individual’s residence. 
 
 
Unsolicited Direct Confession 
One sailor failed to show up for work 
because he said his mother was sick. After 
expressing verbally that I would help him 
get his mother help on several occasions, 
he finally told me that his mother was not 
sick and [he] was late to work because he 
had not awakended [sic] after a long party. 
Verbal/Nonverbal Behavior They kept looking the other way, being 
very unsettled during the questioning. 
 
 
Inconsistencies with Knowledge 
I told a colleauge [sic] about my trip to San 
Diego. He told me he had went to San 
Diego two weeks before and went to Sea 
World. Two weeks later he asked me how 
long of a drive it was from San Diego, in 
which he said that he had not been to San 
Diego before.  
 
 
Combination 
A subordinate didn’t come back from leave 
on time because he said he broke his hand. 
I checked his Facebook page, talked to his 
friends, and spoke with his friends [sic] 
doctor, which proved. 
 
The second half of the questionnaire addresses how many months it had been 
since the respondent was lied to. The time that had lapsed ranged from 0 months 
(immediate) to 180 months (15 years), with the average being 22.84 months (SD=42.85).  
The relationship between the liar and the participant was analyzed for correlation 
as provided in Table 12. Results showed most deceptions occurred between participants 
and their subordinates (44.8%). 
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Table 12. Frequencies of Participant-Deceiver Relationship 
Relationship f % 
Subordinate 13 44.8 
Peer/Friend 9 31 
Other 3 10.3 
Teacher 2 6.9 
Superior/Immediate Boss 1 3.4 
Senior in Rank, but No Command 
Relationship 
1 3.4 
Total 29 100 
 
The final question focused on how much time had passed between the telling of 
the lie and when it was finally discovered. In 17 (58.6%) cases, either participants did not 
provide a response or the response given was ambiguous and could not be accurately 
evaluated. Seven (24.1%) were immediate, in-the-moment judgments, four (13.8%) were 
detected in less than one day, and one (3.4%) was detected in less than one month.   
In the military, discipline is held in high esteem therefore repercussions are 
expected if an individual is caught lying, especially if the lie is to a superior. Park et al. 
supports this by stating “…it can be argued that accuracy should be higher for high stakes 
lies because there should be more nonverbal leakage when the stakes are high” (Park et 
al., 2002, p. 146). The results of Study 2 are discussed next in Chapter IX. 
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IX. STUDY 2: DISCUSSION, FINDINGS, LIMITATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON ANALYSIS 
Study 2 revealed international military officers detected deception first by relying 
on third party information (31.0%), next by relying on physical information (20.7%), and 
then by verbal and nonverbal behavior (17.2%) as illustrated in Table 10. These findings 
are noteworthy in the fact international military officers were consistent with relying on 
third party information followed by physical information, but they had a higher than 
normal reliance on verbal and nonverbal behavior, when compared to the findings of 
previous research. 
A. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS 
Consistent with Park et al. (2002), Lindsey et al. (2014), and Lindsey et al. 
(2015), international military officers relied on third party and physical information to 
detect deception.  Differences between the current findings and previous studies exist, 
however. Table 15 shows the percentages for the same categories for Park et al. (2002), 
Lindsey et al. (2014) and Study 2. 
Table 13. Frequencies of Recalled Lie Discovery Methods. Adapted 
from Park et al. (2002). 
Discovery Method f % 
Third Party Information 62 32.0% 
Combination 60 30.9% 
Physical Information 35 18.0% 
Unsolicited Direct Confession 16 8.2% 
Solicited Direct Confession 7 3.6% 
Verbal/Nonverbal Behavior 4 2.1% 
Inconsistencies with Prior Knowledge 4 2.1% 
Inadvertent Confession 4 2.1% 
Other 2 1.0% 
Total 194 100 
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Table 14. Frequencies of Recalled Lie Discovery Methods Study 2. 
Adapted from Park et al. (2002). 
Discovery Method f % 
Third Party Information 9 31.0% 
Physical Information 6 20.7% 
Verbal/Nonverbal Behavior 5 17.2% 
Combination 4 13.8% 
Inconsistencies with Prior Knowledge 2 6.9% 
Other 2 6.9% 
Unsolicited Direct Confession 1 3.4% 
Solicited Direct Confession 0 0.0% 
Total 29 100 
 
Table 15. Comparison Data for All Studies 
Method Park et al. 
(2002) 
Lindsey et 
al.  (2014) 
Buckley and 
Franz (2016) 
Discovery Method f % f % f % 
Third Party Information 62 32.0% 14 16.9% 9 31.0% 
Physical Information 35 18.0% 12 14.5% 6 22.7% 
Verbal/Nonverbal 
Behavior 
4 2.1% 0 0.0% 5 17.2% 
Two or more 
(combination) 
60 30.9% 9 10.8% 4 13.8% 
Inconstant with Prior 
Knowledge 
4 2.1% 5 6.0% 2 6.9% 
Unsolicited Direct 
Confessions 
16 18.2% 4 4.8% 1 3.4% 
Solicited Direct 
Confessions 
7 3.6% 2 2.4% 0 0.0% 
Inadvertent Confession 4 2.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Other 2 1.0% 1 1.2% 2 6.9% 
None Listed 0 0.0% 36 43.4 0 0.0% 
Totals 194 100 47 100 29 100 
 
The most noteworthy data in Table 15 indicate that verbal/nonverbal behavior 
was a significant factor used by participants when they perceived that they had been lied 
to in the past. Verbal and nonverbal behavior was used amongst 17% of respondents in 
this study compared to 0% in Lindsey et al. (2014), and 2.1% in studies conducted by 
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Park et al. (2002). Also this current study indicates that only 13.8% of respondents used a 
combination of indicators which closely mimics the 10.8% observed in Lindsey et al.’s 
(2015) study, but less than half of the 30.9% observed by Park et al. (2002). Another 
significant inconsistency observed in this current study when compared to Park et al.’s 
(2002) study is that unsolicited direct confessions were obtained by 18.2% of Park et al.’s 
(2002) respondents, versus 3.4% observed in this current study and 4.8% in Lindsey et al. 
(2015).  
B. LIMITATIONS 
Only 56% of the participants from Study 1 completed Study 2. The authors 
believe, although no data are available to support this assumption, international military 
officers might have had difficulty answering some of these questions due to English 
being their secondary language. The open-ended nature of the questions may have led to 
a lower participation rate. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON ANALYSIS 
Replication of Study 2 could be enhanced by changing the data collection method 
from a self-report survey to having participants answer the same questions in an 
interview setting. This would aid the study two-fold; first it would get a higher response 
rate since the participants would feel more comfortable and secondly, by employing this 
method, the data collectors could get more specific data points. By using an interview 
setting, the authors believe a higher response rate would be achieved.  
As the authors were performing the qualitative coding, they had to read the entire 
content of the answers together to properly code each response. If the data collectors 
were conducting an interview, they would be able to clarify answers to specifically meet 
the question without ambiguity. This would lead to a more accurate picture of how 
international military officers detect lies.  
Chapter X discusses the overall summary, recommendation for further research 
and conclusions.  
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X. OVERALL SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATION FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH AND CONCLUSIONS 
This project was effective in replicating findings similar to Levine et al.’s (2014) 
study through the use of diagnostic utility and cue-based deception detection, and in Park 
et al.’s (2002) study on how people actually detect lies. Furthermore, this project 
successfully extended those findings of Lindsey et al. (2015) to international military 
officers stationed at the NPS. Overall, the authors believe this research could be 
replicated with additional populations and yield consistent results to the current research 
and Levine et al. (2014). The studies reported in this project, along with Park et al. 
(2002), Levine et al. (2014), and Lindsey et al. (2014), demonstrated using both 
quantitative and qualitative methods, deception can be detected accurately, but not in the 
typical ways decades of prior research suggested.  
A. SUMMARY 
The intent of this research project was to replicate both Levine et al.’s (2014) 
diagnostic utility methodology and Park et al.’s (2002) method for learning how people 
detect every-day lies. The authors sought to extend previous research by focusing on a 
diverse subset of the NPS international military population. The authors aimed to 
understand how people detect lies and how to improve deception detection rates from the 
long-time plateaued, barely-better-than-chance average of 54%. Future research should 
continue to replicate and extend these methods to various populations such as specific 
international military officers categorized by regions, or even international military 
officers who specialize in counter intelligence or interrogations. From these studies, the 
United States could gain insight into how other countries detect lies. This would aid U.S. 
and international relations, especially within joint military billets. This would also help 
with defector interrogations and counter intelligence settings.  This research project, as 
well as previous efforts by other researchers, indicates utilizing contextual questioning 
methods is superior to reliance on other traditional methods used in detecting deception, 
such as nonverbal cues.  
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Study 1 replicated Levine et al.’s (2014) diagnostic utility research. Results 
revealed employing diagnostic utility and contextual cues can replicate significantly 
increased deception detection accuracy as observed with the current international military 
officer sample. Although the sample is small (N = 52) by traditional measures, is a good 
representation of the international military population at NPS, specifically. The results of 
Study 1 showed deception detection accuracy increased as the question sets incorporated 
more content and contextual questioning methods. Study 1 also incorporated the expertise 
of the participants, as they self-assessed themselves as experts or non-experts as well as 
indicated whether they received formal training. Study 1 further indicated experts 
performed better than non-experts (73.3% versus 66.2% in question set 3) yet those who 
had received no formal training performed better than those who had (69.2 versus 65.4% 
in question set 3). The sample used in this study was not large enough to allow 
comparisons which would discern whether international military officers from a 
particular region, nation, or cultural background had performed better than others. 
Specific cultural, regional, linguistic or political backgrounds might impact the efficacy 
of content and contextual questioning methods for increasing detecting deception 
accuracy, but this is an empirical question the current study could not answer. The results 
of Study 1 were not based on experience or training, as the findings resulted in more 
questions than answers in terms of how experts performed better than non-experts yet 
those without formal training outperformed those with formal training. The results here 
indicate training and experience might have less of an impact on deception detection 
accuracy than diagnostic utility and content and contextual questioning methods. 
Study 1 provided results based on a quantitative replication methodology from 
Levine et al.’s (2014) research. Study 1 revealed the use of diagnostic utility and 
judgment can be replicated as observed with the sample of (N=52) international military 
officers. While the sample seems quite small (N=52), this is a good representation of the 
international military population at NPS. The results of Study 1 proved deception 
detection accuracy increased as the question sets incorporated more content and 
contextual questioning methods. Study 1 also incorporated the expertise of the 
participants, as they identified themselves as experts or non-experts and indicated 
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whether they had received formal training. Study 1 further indicated experts performed 
better than non-experts (73.3% versus 66.2% in question set 3) yet those who received no 
formal training performed better than those who received formal training (69.2 versus 
65.4% in question set 3). The sample used in Study 2 was not large enough to discern 
whether international military officers from a particular region, nation, or cultural 
background had performed better than others. It is possible international military officers 
from a specific cultural, regional, or political background could be better at detecting 
deception than others. This should be researched further using the methodology from 
Levine et al. (2014). The results of Study 1 were not based on experience or training. The 
results show deception detection accuracy is not based on training, but, instead, it is 
based on diagnostic utility and how content and contextual questioning methods are used.  
Study 2 replicated research by Park et al. (2002) to determine how international 
military officers detect lies in their daily work routine, and distinguish if these results 
would mirror Park et al.’s findings. The results of Study 2 showed international military 
officers produced comparable findings to those of Park et al. (2002) and Lindsey et al. 
(2014). Similarities were found in the two most common methods for detecting deception 
in the workplace: third party information and physical information. Also, an unexpected 
and interesting finding from Study 2 was verbal and nonverbal cues were the third 
highest discovery method at 17.2% compared to previous studies showing only 2.1% 
(Park et al., 2002) and 0.0% (Lindsey et al., 2014). The discoveries made in Study 2 aid 
in better understanding the interactions and dynamics which might be different in 
international workplace settings.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
During this research project, several notable findings were brought forward in 
regard to the advancement of deception detection research. Study 1 placed a connection 
between deception detection rates and diagnostic utility. Even though Study 1 made that 
connection it is the author’s recommendation further replication of this study should be 
conducted to get more robust numbers. This is the only way the deception detection 
community can start to see this line of questioning as the new wave for accuracy. Study 1 
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brought up some interesting results including international military officers with no 
formal training outperforming those with formal training. This not only goes against 
conventional wisdom, but also shows accuracy is based more on the content of the 
questions the interrogator asks. The authors recommend further study into how training 
or lack of training, impacts deception detection accuracy. This recommendation would 
lend credence to the notion of diagnostic utility, if training is shown to have a minimal 
impact on accuracy. Additional research should seek to determine if there is any impact 
regarding the participants with no formal training (as they do not carry biases into the 
interrogation room). Study 1 would further benefit from more research into the theories 
of truth biases, honesty effect, and probing effects. This may help explain how training 
can aid or hinder deception detection.  
In addition, the authors would also like to research specialties in the military 
which provide training and education on how to detect deception. It would be interesting 
to investigate the quality and breadth of the training international military officers 
receive. The training international military officers receive may differ in quality 
compared to the training received by U.S. military officers. This could be an additional 
research topic for further study. It is also recommended during Study 1, participants 
should have indicated how they came up with their assessment of how they determined 
who was an “honest non-cheater” and who “cheated and lying about it.” This way the 
data collectors could see how the participants came to their assessment. The data 
collector could also use this data to identify whether the participant received effective 
training as well as whether the formal training was a hindrance or a benefit for their 
deception detection accuracy.  
 Study 2 showed how people detected lies but it also showed how few participants 
answered the questions accurately or at all. Finding out how people detect lies is core to 
this study, and without good data, reliable conclusions cannot be formulated. The overall 
response rate of 77.7% is not bad, but the goal would be to get it as close to 100% as 
possible. The authors recommend replication of this study with the added process of 
sitting down with the participants and asking them the questions on the survey to make 
the participants feel more comfortable, to resolve any issues in communication (based on 
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language barriers), and to further clarify any answers provided by the participant. In 
doing this, the data collectors will be able to get better qualitative and quantitative data.  
 The authors identified a possible area of continued research into international 
military officers by region, nation, or cultural background. Since this project did not 
collect data on these categories it would be interesting to see if one particular region 
detects lies more accurately then others. If this is a finding, further research would be 
needed to isolate the reasons the sample used in this study was not large enough to allow 
comparisons which would discern whether international military officers from a 
particular region, nation, or cultural background performed better than others. Specific 
cultural, regional, linguistic or political backgrounds might impact the efficacy of content 
and contextual questioning methods for increasing detecting deception accuracy, but this 
is an empirical question which the current study could not answer.  
Limitations in the research project were mainly two-fold: recruitment and low 
participation in Study 2. Recruiting international military officers to participate in this 
research project proved difficult. This may have been due to a stringent course load at 
NPS or possibly feeling like they wouldn’t bring any new information to the table. The 
authors reached out to the Director of the International Graduate Programs Office to aid 
in recruitment. It is recommended for further replication of this research project to have a 
very robust recruitment strategy and contacts within the International Graduate Programs 
Office before implementation. Additionally, performing liaison as well as coordinating 
with the International Graduate Programs Office on events which specifically target 
international military officers would increase the recruitment and participation of 
international military officers. As for low participation in Study 2, the authors previously 
recommended implementing an interview portion would yield better numbers for 
analysis. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
This research project replicated the finding of Levine et al. (2014) and Park et al. 
(2002), through diagnostic utility using content and contextual questioning methods and 
quantitative analysis in Study 1, this research project yielded a higher deception detection 
rate than the Bond and DePaulo (2006) meta-analysis rate of 54%. Qualitatively, the 
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authors found international military officers relied on third party and physical 
information as opposed to relying on verbal and nonverbal indicators. Additionally, this 
research project has highlighted experts perform better using diagnostic utility 
questioning methods over non-experts. Finally, this research project found participants 
with no training consistently outperformed participants with training. Further research is 
needed to explain why this occurred.  
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APPENDIX.  CONSENT FORM AND QUESTIONNAIRE 
The following consent form was taken directly from and used in the extension and 
replication of the research conducted by Lindsey et al. (2015).  
 
Consent Form 
You are invited to participate in a research study to measure your perceptions about 
others’ communication. The purpose of the research is to better understand how people’s 
perceptions of communication impact their judgments. Your participation should take 
about 30 minutes to complete. 
You will be asked to watch short video clips, make judgments about each clip, and 
complete a survey about past experiences you have had with similar communication 
situations. 
Your participation is voluntary. If you participate, you are free to skip any questions or 
stop participating at any time [sic] without penalty. The alternative to participating in the 
research is to not participate. 
Your responses are anonymous and will not be linked to your identity in any way. No 
personally-identifying information will be collected—the survey only asks for broad 
demographic information and no other identifiers from participants. 
The anticipated benefit from this study is that the findings will contribute to a larger body 
of knowledge, and they will be used to inform coursework at NPS. You will not directly 
benefit from your participation in this research. 
There are no known or anticipated risks associated with participation. 
Results of the survey will be used responsibly and protected against release to 
unauthorized persons; however, there is a minor risk that data collected could be 
mismanaged. Only the researchers will have access to the data which will be stored on a 
password-protected computer. 
If you have questions regarding the research, or if you experience any injury or 
discomfort, contact Dr. Lisa Lindsey, LLindsey@nps.edu, Principal-Investigator. If you 
have any questions regarding your rights as a research subject, please contact the Naval 
Postgraduate School IRB Chair, Dr. Larry Shattuck, 831.656.2473, lgshattu@nps.edu. 
Statement of Consent. I have read the information provided above. I have been given 
the opportunity to ask questions and all the questions have been answered to my 
satisfaction. I agree to participate in this study. I understand that by agreeing to 
participate in this research and checking the box below, I do not waive any of my legal 
rights. 
☐ I consent to participate in the research study. 
☐ I do not consent to participate in the research study. 
  
 52 
You will see three sets of videotaped interviews. The basic situation is always the same, 
but the interviewer, the person interviewed, and the questions are different.  
 
Background: These clips are of interviews with college students who participated in a 
study about teamwork. Each subject had just played a trivia game with a partner for a 
cash prize. All participants were given an opportunity to cheat when the experimenter 
was called out of the room, and the answers were left in a folder within easy reach of the 
participants. Some participants cheated and others did not. All the people being 
interviewed on these tapes denied cheating. 
 
Instructions: Watch each interview and decided if you think they cheated or not. For 
each interview, circle an answer indicating your opinion about whether you think that 
they were honest and did not cheat or that they really did cheat and are lying about not 
cheating. 
 
Set 1  Video: Exline1_4clips (6 min.) 
Number  Interview Judgment (circle one) 
1  39  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
2  45  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
3  44  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
4  54  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
Set 2  Video: Exline2_4clips (11 min) 
Number  Interview Judgment (circle one) 
5  54  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
6  57  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
7  71  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
8  72  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
Set 3  Video: Exline4_4clips (12 min) 
Number  Interview Judgment (circle one) 
9  25  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
10  18  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
11  10  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
12  12  Honest non-cheater  Cheated and lying about it 
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Finally, we’d like for you to recall a recent work-related situation in which you 
discovered that someone lied to you. Please take a moment to think of an example and 
remember as much as you can about what happened. Keeping this situation in mind, 
please answer the following questions: 
 
1. Recall as much as you can about the situation in which the person originally lied 
to you. In as much detail as possible, describe the event where you were lied to: 
Where did it happen? What was the lie about? If you can, be sure to write down 
the exact thing that the person said to you. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. How long ago did this event (the lie) originally take place? 
 
 
 
 
3. What was/is the relationship between you and the person who lied to you? 
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4. Now, think about how you found out that the person lied to you. Describe in as 
much detail as you can the events surrounding your discovery of the lie: How 
exactly did you find out that the person lied to you? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please tell us about yourself (circle the correct answer or fill in the blank):    
Sex:  Male    Female      Age: ________ Years of Military Service: _______   
Rank: ____________ Branch (circle one):  Army Navy   Air Force Marines 
Have you ever received formal interviewing or interrogation training?  No    Yes 
Have you ever conducted interviewing or interrogation as a regular part of your job?  No    
Yes 
Are you:    U.S. Military International Military (please specify country) 
________________ 
Race/Ethnicity: Caucasian/White 
African American/Black 
Asian/Pacific Islander 
Hispanic/Latino(a) 
American Indian 
Alaskan or Hawaiian Native 
Other (please specify) ______________________________ 
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